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We present a scheme for hiding bits in Bell states that is secure even when the sharers Alice and
Bob are allowed to carry out local quantum operations and classical communication. We prove that
the information that Alice and Bob can gain about a hidden bit is exponentially small in n, the
number of qubits in each share, and can be made arbitrarily small for hiding multiple bits. We
indicate an alternative efficient low-entanglement method for preparing the shared quantum states.
We discuss how our scheme can be implemented using present-day quantum optics.
The protection of a secret by sharing it, that is, by ap-
portioning the secret data among two or more parties so
that the data only become intelligible as a consequence
of their cooperative action, is an important capability in
modern information processing. Here we give a method
of using particular quantum states to share a secret be-
tween two parties (Alice and Bob), in which the data is
hidden in a fundamentally stronger way than is possi-
ble in any classical scheme. We prove that even if Alice
and Bob can communicate via a classical channel, they
can only obtain arbitrarily little information about the
hidden data. They can unlock the secret only by joint
quantum measurements, which require either a quantum
channel, shared quantum entanglement, or direct inter-
action between them. We show that the creation of these
secret shares can be done with just a small expenditure
of quantum entanglement: no more than one Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen pair per secret bit shared.
Our results are part of a larger exploration of the
information-theoretic capabilities of quantum mechan-
ics, notable examples of which (quantum key distribu-
tion [1] and quantum teleportation [2]) have now begun
to be realized in the laboratory. The extent to which
quantum states can hide shared data can be viewed as a
new information-theoretic characterization of the quan-
tum nonlocality of these states. Other workers have pre-
viously identified quantum secret sharing protocols [3,4],
in which participants (possibly more than two) receive
shares of either quantum or classical data. In this previ-
ous work, however, there is no guarantee that the data
remains hidden if the parties choose to communicate clas-
sically. In fact, recent analysis [5] has shown that, for a
single hidden bit, secrecy in the presence of classical com-
munication is impossible if the shares consist of parts of
two orthogonal pure quantum states. This stronger form
of data hiding is nonetheless possible, as we will show,
but only when the shares are made up from mixed quan-
tum states.
Unlike usual secret sharing schemes, the security in our
scheme does not depend on certain parties being honest
or malevolent; we assume that both Alice and Bob are
malevolent in the sense that they would go to any length
to determine the hidden bit. The security of our scheme
relies on the fact that Alice and Bob are restricted in
their operations, a condition that could be enforced by
a third party. One can imagine, for example, a situation
in which the third party (the boss) has a piece of data
on which she would like Alice and Bob (some employ-
ees) to act without the sensitive data being revealed to
them, or, in another scenario, the secret could be given
to Alice and Bob and be revealed to them at a later
stage determined by the boss. Our scheme is such that
at some later stage, the boss can provide the employees
with entanglement that enables the parties to determine
the secret with 100% certainty. This last idea can in fact
be used to establish a form of conditionally secure quan-
tum bit commitment [6]. For these scenarios to work,
we have to assume that the boss controls the (quantum)
channel which connects the two parties: Alice and Bob
are not allowed to communicate via a quantum channel.
This prohibition can be enforced by the boss by putting
dephasing or noisy operations in their channel. Further-
more, the boss controls the labs in which the employees
operate; for example she can, prior to operation, sweep
those labs clean of any entanglement (again by dephas-
ing).
We present our protocol and prove its security for a
one-bit secret b; at the end we indicate the proof of the
security of its multibit extension. The protocol involves
a “hider” (the boss above) who prepares one of two or-
thogonal bipartite quantum states ρ
(n)
b=0 or ρ
(n)
b=1 based on
the value of b, and presents the two parts of the state
to Alice and Bob. n is an integer which determines the
degree of security of the protocol. The hider is assumed
to have a supply of each of the four Bell states, defined as
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉±|11〉) and |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉±|10〉). |Ψ−〉
is a spin singlet while the other three are spin triplets.
When b = 1, the hider picks at random a set of n Bell
states with uniform probability, except that the number
of singlets must be odd. The b = 0 protocol is the same,
except that the number of singlets must be even. The
hider distributes the n Bell states to Alice and Bob; for
each Bell state the first qubit goes to Alice and the second
to Bob.
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To prove the security of this protocol, we must con-
sider what information Alice and Bob can gather about
the bit b. We assume that Alice and Bob can perform any
sequence of Local quantum Operations supplemented by
unlimited 2-way Classical Communication (we abbrevi-
ate this class of operations as LOCC). This class of oper-
ations does not permit measurements in the basis of Bell
states, from which the bit could easily be determined:
Alice and Bob simply count the number of singlets mea-
sured and compute the parity. In fact, we will show that
the information that Alice and Bob can learn about the
hidden bit is exponentially small in the number n of Bell
states that the hider uses for the encoding.
Before analyzing the security of our protocol, let
us pause and consider the possibility for realizing our
scheme in a physical experiment. The protocol that we
have described above can be implemented in a present-
day quantum optics lab in the following way. The hider
needs to be able to make any one of the 4 Bell states;
with an optical downconverter she can make a maxi-
mally entangled state between two polarization modes
1√
2
(| l , l〉+ | ↔ ,↔〉) [7] and by further single qubit op-
erations she can map this state onto any of the other three
Bell states. The photons can be sent through two optical
fibers to the Alice and Bob locations. Then Alice and
Bob can attempt to unlock the secret by LOCC (in Ref.
[6] we will describe an optimal and simple LOCC pro-
cedure, involving only 1-qubit gates). For the complete
unlocking of the secret, a quantum channel between Al-
ice and Bob is opened up and Alice’s photons are sent to
Bob. Finally, Bob will need to do a measurement which
distinguishes the singlet state 1√
2
(| l ,↔〉−| ↔ , l〉) from
the other three other Bell states. Such an incomplete
measurement has been performed in the lab [7]; a full
Bell measurement is not necessary and is also not techno-
logically feasible in current experiments. Our alternative
low-entanglement preparation scheme will be somewhat
more involved in the lab but is interesting nonetheless.
As we will discuss, what is needed are quantum oper-
ations in the Clifford group, including some particular
one-qubit gates obtainable by linear optics in addition
to the CNOT gate which cannot be implemented per-
fectly by using linear optical elements. However, recent
work by Knill et al. [8] shows that a CNOT gate can be
implemented near-deterministically in linear optics when
single-photon sources are available.
Let us now pass to the security proof of our scheme.
The LOCC class, even though it plays a fundamental role
in the theory of quantum entanglement, is remarkably
hard to characterize succinctly [9]. However, our analy-
sis will rely on just one important feature that all LOCC
operations share: they cannot create quantum entangle-
ment between Alice and Bob if they are initially unen-
tangled. We consider a general measurement scheme for
Alice and Bob that, irrespective of its precise physical
implementation, leads to just two final outcomes, “0” or
“1”. It can thus be described as a POVM (Positive Oper-
ator Valued Measure) measurement [10], with two POVM
elements, M0 ≥ 0 and M1 ≥ 0, associated with outcomes
“0” and “1” respectively. In our case, M0,1 operate on a
Hilbert space of dimension 22n, corresponding to the di-
mension of the input states. For an input density matrix
ρ, the outcome b occurs with probability Tr(ρMb). Prob-
ability conservation implies that M0 +M1 = I, where I
is the identity matrix.
(a)
(b)
Alie
Bob

M
Outome \b = 0, 1"
with prob. Tr(M
b
)
M
b
9
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
;
State = M
T
b
=Tr(M
b
)
with prob. Tr(M
b
)=4
n
Alie
Bob
j	
max
i
j	
max
i
 

 

FIG. 1. (a) A bipartite POVM measurement M per-
formed on input ρ. Single horizontal lines are quantum reg-
isters, and double lines are classical registers. The box repre-
sents a protocol (and circuit) for performing M. (b) A LOCC
protocol that prepares a state proportional to MTb . The two
registers of the maximally entangled states |Ψmax〉 are rep-
resented by two lines connected in the far left. The output
probabilities are given by Tr ρMb with ρ = I/4
n.
A POVM measurement M for a bipartite input is de-
picted in Fig. 1(a). Such a POVM measurement imple-
mented by LOCC cannot create quantum entanglement.
This condition translates to two necessary conditions on
the measurement, (1 ⊗ T )[Mb] ≥ 0 for b = 0, 1. Here,
1 is the identity operation on Alice’s system, T is the
matrix transposition on Bob’s system, T [|i〉〈j|] = |j〉〈i|,
and 1⊗T is called the partial transpose operation. These
conditions are proved as follows: Suppose Alice and Bob
each prepares a maximally entangled state |Ψmax〉 =
1√
2n
∑2n−1
i=0 |i〉|i〉 in his own lab. Then they apply the
measurement M, each on one register of |Ψmax〉, as il-
lustrated in Fig. 1(b). When outcome b is obtained, the
residual state in the two unmeasured halves is propor-
tional to
ρf ∝
∑
i,j,m,n
|i, j〉〈m,n| Tr [Mb |i, j〉〈m,n|]
=
∑
l,j,m,n
〈i, j|MTb |m,n〉|i, j〉〈m,n| = M
T
b , (1)
where MTb is the matrix transpose of Mb. Thus
Fig. 1(b) prescribes a LOCC procedure to create the
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states MTb /Tr(Mb), since the input maximally entangled
states are prepared by Alice and Bob locally. There-
fore, the states MTb /Tr(Mb) are necessarily unentangled
and, following the Peres criterion [11], they are posi-
tive under partial transposition (PPT), meaning that
(1⊗T )[MTb ] ≥ 0, which in turns implies (1⊗T )[Mb] ≥ 0.
We now use the constraints that M0,1 are PPT to
bound the probability of a successful measurement. In
particular we consider the probability p0|0 that Alice
and Bob decide for outcome “0” when the hider has
prepared ρ
(n)
0 (corresponding to the hidden bit b = 0),
which is equal to p0|0 = TrM0ρ
(n)
0 . Similarly we define
p1|1 = TrM1ρ
(n)
1 , the probability of outcome “1” when
ρ
(n)
1 is prepared by the hider.
First, we show that it is not necessary to consider the
most general pair of PPT operatorsM0 and M1. If there
exists a general pair (M0,M1) obeying the PPT con-
straints, then there is another PPT pair (M˜0, M˜1) which
is diagonal in the basis of n Bell states, such that the
measurement with M˜0 and M˜1 has the same probabili-
ties of success p0|0 and p1|1. M˜0 and M˜1 are related to
M0 andM1 by an action called partial twirling [12] which
removes all off-diagonal terms in the Bell basis and leaves
the diagonal terms unchanged.
The argument involves three observations. (1) Par-
tial twirling can be implemented by LOCC operations
[12] which preserve the PPT property [13]. Thus (1 ⊗
T )[M˜0,1] ≥ 0. (2) The trace-preservation condition
M0 +M1 = I is invariant under twirling, and therefore
M˜0 + M˜1 = I. (3) The states to be measured, ρ
(n)
0 and
ρ
(n)
1 , are mixtures of tensor products of n Bell states and
thus are Bell-diagonal. It follows that p0|0 = TrM0ρ
(n)
0 =
TrM˜0ρ
(n)
0 and likewise p1|1 = TrM˜1ρ
(n)
1 , because the off-
diagonal terms of M0,1 do not contribute to the trace.
This establishes the argument; we can, without loss of
generality, restrict to a measurement with Bell diagonal
POVM elements.
To carry the analysis further we introduce a com-
pact notation [12] that represents each of the four Bell
states by two bits, as follows: |Φ+〉 → 00, |Φ−〉 → 01,
|Ψ+〉 → 10 and the singlet |Ψ−〉 → 11. A product of n
Bell states is thus represented by a 2n-bit string s. The
four Bell states can be rotated into each other by local
Pauli-matrix rotations, involving one half of the entan-
gled state only. In the language of binary strings, we can
also associate two bits with each of the Pauli matrices,
σx → 10, σz → 01, σy → 11 and I → 00. This notation
is convenient because the Pauli matrices then act on the
two bits characterizing the Bell state by a bitwise XOR.
For example (σz ⊗ I)|Φ+〉 = |Φ−〉 can be represented as
01⊕ 00 = 01. Using the identity
(1⊗ T )[|Φ+〉〈Φ+|] =
1
2 (|Φ
+〉〈Φ+|+ |Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| − |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|) (2)
permits the operators (1⊗T )⊗n[M0,1] to be written very
compactly in the binary-string notation. We denote the
diagonal matrix elements of M0 and M1 in the basis of
products of n Bell states (labeled by the 2n-bit string s)
by αs and βs respectively. Using the fact that strings of
Bell states can be converted to each other by local Pauli
operations, we can compute the diagonal matrix elements
of the equation (1 ⊗ T )⊗n[M0] ≥ 0 in the binary-string
notation. We obtain the condition
∑
s
αs⊕m(−1)N11(s) ≥ 0 , (3)
for all 2n-bit strings m, where N11(s) is the number
of times that a 11 pair appears in the binary string s.
Through the association of Bell states with 2n-bit strings,
N11(s) is precisely the number of singlets |Ψ−〉 among
the set of n Bell states. The same calculation for M1
gives
∑
s
βs⊕m(−1)N11(s) ≥ 0 for all m. With the rela-
tion αs = 1 − βs, resulting directly from M0 +M1 = I,
and the identity
∑
s
(−1)N11(s) = 2n (which can shown
by evaluating a simple binomial sum), we obtain that,
for all 2n-bit strings m
0 ≤
∑
s
αs⊕m(−1)N11(s) ≤ 2n. (4)
By setting m = 00 . . . 00 in this equation, we
can express the probabilities of success, p0|0 =
2/(22n + 2n)
∑
s|N11(s) is even αs and p1|1 = 2/(2
2n −
2n)
∑
s|N11(s) is odd βs, in terms of these two inequalities.
This result bounds the sum p0|0 + p1|1 − 1 in both ways
− δ ≤ p0|0 + p1|1 − 1 ≤ δ , (5)
where δ = 1/2n−1. This result establishes the hiding
property: for δ = 0 (corresponding to n → ∞), Alice
and Bob’s measurement outcomes can be faithfully sim-
ulated by a coin flip with bias p0|0, and so give no in-
formation about the identity of the state. There is also
an information-theoretic interpretation of this result; we
can show [6] that, as a consequence of these inequali-
ties, the mutual information [14] I(B : M) is bounded
by δH(B), where B is the bit value and M is the out-
come of any LOCC measurement by Alice and Bob, not
just a two-outcome one. Here H(B) [14] is the Shannon
information of the hidden bit, which equals 1 in the case
of equal prior probabilities for b = 0 and b = 1.
We now return to the question of how the hider can
produce the states ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 using minimal entangle-
ment between the two shares. We will demand that the
procedure to create ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 is efficient as a quantum
computation, that is, since each hiding state consists of
2n qubits, we seek a procedure to create these states with
little entanglement, using a number of quantum compu-
tation steps polynomial in n.
We use a convenient alternative representation of these
two density matrices:
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ρ
(n)
0 = qnρ
(n−1)
1 ⊗ ρ
(1)
1 + (1− qn)ρ
(n−1)
0 ⊗ ρ
(1)
0 ,
ρ
(n)
1 = pnρ
(n−1)
0 ⊗ ρ
(1)
1 + (1− pn)ρ
(n−1)
1 ⊗ ρ
(1)
0 . (6)
The mixing coefficients are determined by the uniformity
of the Bell mixtures and proper normalization:
qn =
2n−1−1
2(2n+1) , pn =
2n−1+1
2(2n−1) . (7)
This representation can be easily understood by realizing
that in order to make, say, a mixture of n Bell states
with an even number of singlets, we can take a mixture
of n−1 Bell states with an odd number of singlets and an
additional singlet or (with the appropriate probability)
a mixture of n − 1 Bell states with an even number of
singlets and another Bell state which is not a singlet.
Solving the recurrence relations for these two den-
sity matrices, we find that ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 are both so-
called Werner density matrices [15]: linear combina-
tions of the identity matrix I and the matrix H =
(1 ⊗ T )⊗n[|Φ+〉〈Φ+|⊗n]. In particular, ρ(n)0 ∝ I + 2
nH
and ρ
(n)
1 ∝ I−2
nH . It is known from previous work that
the Werner state ρ
(n)
0 is unentangled [16]. In fact, we can
show [6] that it is possible to make ρ
(n)
0 by first choosing a
random element U of the Clifford group Cn [17] and then
applying U ⊗U on the state |0〉⊗n⊗ |0〉⊗n, i.e. the hider
applies the same rotation U on both n-qubit shares of the
state. It can be shown that this procedure takes O(n2)
1-qubit and 2-qubit gates [17] and polynomial classical
computation [6]. On the other hand, the Werner state
ρ
(n)
1 is entangled; its entanglement of formation is known
to be one ebit [18]. Using Eq. (6) for ρ
(n)
1 and the fact
that ρ
(n)
0 is unentangled, we show explicitly how the hider
can recursively create ρ
(n)
1 using just one singlet: (1) The
hider flips a coin with bias pn for 0, and bias 1−pn for 1.
(2) If the outcome is 0, then the hider prepares a tensor
product of ρ
(n−1)
0 and one singlet |Ψ
−〉〈Ψ−|. This costs
one ebit, since ρ
(n−1)
0 is unentangled. If the outcome is 1,
then she prepares ρ
(n−1)
1 ⊗ ρ
(1)
0 . Here ρ
(1)
0 again requires
no entanglement, and ρ
(n−1)
1 can similarly be prepared
by the process just described.
Finally, we note that the obvious extension of the pro-
tocol presented here permits the sharing of an arbitrary
number of bits. The hider simply encodes every bit in
a different block of Bell states as discussed above. The
security analysis is more involved, since it cannot be ex-
cluded that joint measurements on all tensor product
components provide more information than a measure-
ment on each component separately. By exploiting the
symmetry of the hiding states as expressed by their rep-
resentation as Werner states, we are able to bound the
mutual information I(B :M) = I(B1B2 . . . Bk :M) ≤ ǫ,
where M is now any multi-state random variable ob-
tained from a measurement scheme on the k encoded
bits, provided that n, the number of Bell states in each
block encoding Bi, scales as n(k)→ 2k+log k+log log e+
log 1/ǫ in the large k limit. This result has been derived
[6] for the case of equal prior probabilities 1/2k for all
k-bit strings.
In conclusion, we have shown how to share bits in a pair
of quantum states such that an Alice and a Bob who do
not share quantum entanglement and cannot communi-
cate quantum data, can learn arbitrarily little informa-
tion about the bits, whereas Alice and Bob can obtain
the bits reliably if they are given these resources.
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